This is in response to an email I received from my cousin Mike, who has a misaligned (pro-Bush) view of the Iraq War...
I stand by my assertion that the Bush Administration was hoping to secure a long-term stable source of oil in the Mideast by ousting the government & inserting a new one. I'm sure it wasn't the primary purpose, but those that were manipulating Bush certainly used it as a selling point. They used the guise of WMD & an EVIL DICTATOR to justify the war. Bush was duped into believing all that stuff about WMD. And an EVIL DICTATOR alone is no reason to invade a country & try to have things our way. No way.
This whole Iraq war is an utter fiasco, and will prove to be a horrible failure. Why not pull out now? Why delay the inevitable? It will eventually fall into civil war and probably end up worse than it was 5 years ago. Doesn't matter if we pull out now, or we pull out later. It'll probably look a lot like Iran in 10 years. How many people have been killed in Iraq since we began? How many people have been maimed? How many lives destroyed? How many families wrecked? Is it worth it? I emphatically say NO.
How much money have we spent in Iraq? Think about all the good we could have done in this country with that money. Just think about that. This war is stupid.
Have you heard about Pat Buchanan's new book... Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War. I've heard a lot of people make comparisons to WW2 when trying to justify the Iraq war. Well, Buchanan argues that WW2 and the 40 million people that died could have all been avoided by better diplomacy by the Brits. That Hitler never wanted war with Britain, and that the holocaust didn't start happening until the war starting sliding in the favor of the Allied Forces. Obviously, this is a controversial book. I don't have great knowledge of WW2 history, so I can't discern all the facts, but it's certainly interesting to think that if WW2 could have been avoided, then certainly this war with Iraq could have been avoided.
I voted for Bush twice, and early on I forcibly argued with others as a Bush supporter. It will probably not be the last time I'm on the wrong side of an issue, but hopefully I'm learning. I have to turn away from the TV & Radio every time I hear Bush speak. I can't stand to look at him. Some people say the man is brilliant, some say he's a moron. I don't care, all I know is that he's failed this country BIG TIME as commander in chief.
17 comments:
Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister of Britain on 28th May, 1937. Over the next two years Chamberlain's Conservative government became associated with the foreign policy that later became known as appeasement.
Chamberlain believed that Germany had been badly treated by the Allies after it was defeated in the First World War. He therefore thought that the German government had genuine grievances and that these needed to be addressed. He also thought that by agreeing to some of the demands being made by Adolf Hitler of Germany and Benito Mussolini of Italy, he could avoid a European war.
Anthony Eden, Chamberlain's foreign secretary, did not agree with the policy of appeasement and resigned in February, 1938. Eden was replaced by Lord Halifax who fully supported this policy. Halifax had already developed a good relationship with the German government. After his first visit to Nazi Germany he told his friend, Henry (Chips) Channon: "He (Halifax) told me he liked all the Nazi leaders, even Goebbels, and he was much impressed, interested and amused by the visit. He thinks the regime absolutely fantastic."
In November, 1937, Neville Chamberlain sent Lord Halifax to meet Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels and Hermann Goering in Germany. In his diary, Lord Halifax records how he told Hitler: "Although there was much in the Nazi system that profoundly offended British opinion, I was not blind to what he (Hitler) had done for Germany, and to the achievement from his point of view of keeping Communism out of his country." This was a reference to the fact that Hitler had banned the Communist Party (KPD) in Germany and placed its leaders in Concentration Camps.
In February, 1938, Adolf Hitler invited Kurt von Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, to meet him at Berchtesgarden. Hitler demanded concessions for the Austrian Nazi Party. Schuschnigg refused and after resigning was replaced by Arthur Seyss-Inquart, the leader of the Austrian Nazi Party. On 13th March, Seyss-Inquart invited the German Army to occupy Austria and proclaimed union with Germany.
The union of Germany and Austria (Anschluss) had been specifically forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. Some members of the House of Commons, including Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill, now called on Neville Chamberlain to take action against Adolf Hitler and his Nazi government.
Hugh Christie an MI6 agent working based in Berlin, met with Hermann Goering on 3rd February 1937. He immediately reported his conversation with Goering and included information that Germany intended to take control of Austria and Czechoslovakia. He also told Christie that Germany mainly wanted "a free hand in Eastern Europe."
In March 1938 Hugh Christie told the British government that Adolf Hitler would be ousted by the military if Britain joined forces with Czechoslovakia against Germany. Christie warned that the "crucial question is 'How soon will the next step against Czechoslovakia be tried?' ... The probability is that the delay will not exceed two or three months at most, unless France and England provide the deterrent, for which cooler heads in Germany are praying."
International tension increased when Adolf Hitler began demanding that the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia should be under the control of the German government. In an attempt to to solve the crisis, the heads of the governments of Germany, Britain, France and Italy met in Munich in September, 1938.
On 29th September, 1938, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Edouard Daladier and Benito Mussolini signed the Munich Agreement which transferred to Germany the Sudetenland, a fortified frontier region that contained a large German-speaking population. When Eduard Benes, Czechoslovakia's head of state, who had not been invited to Munich, protested at this decision, Chamberlain told him that Britain would be unwilling to go to war over the issue of the Sudetenland.
The Munich Agreement was popular with most people in Britain because it appeared to have prevented a war with Germany. However, some politicians, including Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, attacked the agreement. These critics pointed out that no only had the British government behaved dishonorably, but it had lost the support of Czech Army, one of the best in Europe.
One staunch critic of appeasement was the journalist Vernon Bartlett. He was approached by Richard Acland to stand as an anti-Chamberlain candidate at a by-election in Bridgwater. Bartlett agreed and in November, 1938, surprisingly won the previously safe Tory seat. Henry (Chips) Channon , a junior member of the government wrote in his diary: "This is the worst blow the Government has had since 1935".
In March, 1939, the German Army seized the rest of Czechoslovakia. In taking this action Adolf Hitler had broken the Munich Agreement. The British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, now realized that Hitler could not be trusted and his appeasement policy now came to an end.
Mike - please summarize what your point, and leave a link to all that copied content so we know where it came from. Thanks ~ Jeff
Jeff. Ok. I'll play. you start with this whopper: I stand by my assertion that the Bush Administration was hoping to secure a long-term stable source of oil in the Mideast by ousting the government & inserting a new one.
When you say "the government" you trivialize Saddam’s regime.
In 1988, after 8 years of war with Iran (where he was peppered with US support), Saddam murdered (with WMD) over 200000 men, women and children. This is what ended up costing him his life - an Iraqi court found him guilty of murder.
In 1991, he invaded Kuwait. We carved too thin of a war policy and instead of taking Saddam out then - Bush #1 stated he was only interested in pushing Saddam back. By making his war stance too rigid, we were forced to deal with Saddam another day - post 9/11. By your stated position - you had to be pleased, because we negotiated with Saddam – for 12 FRICKEN YEARS.
After Gulf I, Saddam had INTERNATIONAL rules - and for 12 years he flipped the bird at those internationally imposed sanctions, etc. In fact, in 2004-2006 it was established he received an estimate of 2 billion cash in the oil for food scandal - with the same governments who were voting to impose sanctions, etc.
But resolution 1441 was unanimous.
Saddam was shooting at our planes every week prior to war.
He was actively supporting terror by paying out $25000 to families of suicide bombers.
In 1998 our US Senate voted unanimously for regime change in Iraq. Would they have done this if we were talking about "the government"? Like it was Singapore or Malaysia?
There are hundreds more examples of Saddam’s terror on his own people. Google “Iraqi mass graves”
Yet, you embrace a policy of an isolationist (Buchanan) and suggest talking to Saddam for another 12+ years in a post 9/11 world would have worked. Perhaps, but there are many examples of failed negotiations with evil "the governments" - Chamberlain being the most obvious.
Pat knows this - he disagrees with the war vehemently due to his deep isolationist policy positions, however - like Pat, your complaints have no solution to the question:
What if we had left Saddam in power?
1441 was abundantly clear - Bush followed through on it - and while you can argue perhaps he pulled the trigger a few months early or that he has completely fubared the war, 1441 made it clear, the trigger needed to be pulled.
Transcript: President Clinton explains Iraq strike
CLINTON: Good evening.
Earlier today, I ordered America's armed forces to strike military and security targets in Iraq. They are joined by British forces. Their mission is to attack Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors.
Their purpose is to protect the national interest of the United States, and indeed the interests of people throughout the Middle East and around the world.
Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas or biological weapons.
I want to explain why I have decided, with the unanimous recommendation of my national security team, to use force in Iraq; why we have acted now; and what we aim to accomplish.
Six weeks ago, Saddam Hussein announced that he would no longer cooperate with the United Nations weapons inspectors called UNSCOM. They are highly professional experts from dozens of countries. Their job is to oversee the elimination of Iraq's capability to retain, create and use weapons of mass destruction, and to verify that Iraq does not attempt to rebuild that capability.
The inspectors undertook this mission first 7.5 years ago at the end of the Gulf War when Iraq agreed to declare and destroy its arsenal as a condition of the ceasefire.
The international community had good reason to set this requirement. Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there is one big difference: He has used them. Not once, but repeatedly. Unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops during a decade-long war. Not only against soldiers, but against civilians, firing Scud missiles at the citizens of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iran. And not only against a foreign enemy, but even against his own people, gassing Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq.
The international community had little doubt then, and I have no doubt today, that left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will use these terrible weapons again.
The United States has patiently worked to preserve UNSCOM as Iraq has sought to avoid its obligation to cooperate with the inspectors. On occasion, we've had to threaten military force, and Saddam has backed down.
Faced with Saddam's latest act of defiance in late October, we built intensive diplomatic pressure on Iraq backed by overwhelming military force in the region. The UN Security Council voted 15 to zero to condemn Saddam's actions and to demand that he immediately come into compliance.
Eight Arab nations -- Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman -- warned that Iraq alone would bear responsibility for the consequences of defying the UN.
When Saddam still failed to comply, we prepared to act militarily. It was only then at the last possible moment that Iraq backed down. It pledged to the UN that it had made, and I quote, a clear and unconditional decision to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors.
I decided then to call off the attack with our airplanes already in the air because Saddam had given in to our demands. I concluded then that the right thing to do was to use restraint and give Saddam one last chance to prove his willingness to cooperate.
I made it very clear at that time what unconditional cooperation meant, based on existing UN resolutions and Iraq's own commitments. And along with Prime Minister Blair of Great Britain, I made it equally clear that if Saddam failed to cooperate fully, we would be prepared to act without delay, diplomacy or warning.
Now over the past three weeks, the UN weapons inspectors have carried out their plan for testing Iraq's cooperation. The testing period ended this weekend, and last night, UNSCOM's chairman, Richard Butler, reported the results to UN Secretary-General Annan.
The conclusions are stark, sobering and profoundly disturbing.
In four out of the five categories set forth, Iraq has failed to cooperate. Indeed, it actually has placed new restrictions on the inspectors. Here are some of the particulars.
Iraq repeatedly blocked UNSCOM from inspecting suspect sites. For example, it shut off access to the headquarters of its ruling party and said it will deny access to the party's other offices, even though UN resolutions make no exception for them and UNSCOM has inspected them in the past.
Iraq repeatedly restricted UNSCOM's ability to obtain necessary evidence. For example, Iraq obstructed UNSCOM's effort to photograph bombs related to its chemical weapons program.
It tried to stop an UNSCOM biological weapons team from videotaping a site and photocopying documents and prevented Iraqi personnel from answering UNSCOM's questions.
Prior to the inspection of another site, Iraq actually emptied out the building, removing not just documents but even the furniture and the equipment.
Iraq has failed to turn over virtually all the documents requested by the inspectors. Indeed, we know that Iraq ordered the destruction of weapons-related documents in anticipation of an UNSCOM inspection.
So Iraq has abused its final chance.
As the UNSCOM reports concludes, and again I quote, "Iraq's conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in the fields of disarmament.
"In light of this experience, and in the absence of full cooperation by Iraq, it must regrettably be recorded again that the commission is not able to conduct the work mandated to it by the Security Council with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons program."
In short, the inspectors are saying that even if they could stay in Iraq, their work would be a sham.
Saddam's deception has defeated their effectiveness. Instead of the inspectors disarming Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors.
This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize the chance.
And so we had to act and act now.
Let me explain why.
First, without a strong inspection system, Iraq would be free to retain and begin to rebuild its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs in months, not years.
Second, if Saddam can crippled the weapons inspection system and get away with it, he would conclude that the international community -- led by the United States -- has simply lost its will. He will surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction, and someday -- make no mistake -- he will use it again as he has in the past.
Third, in halting our air strikes in November, I gave Saddam a chance, not a license. If we turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam will be destroyed. We will not only have allowed Saddam to shatter the inspection system that controls his weapons of mass destruction program; we also will have fatally undercut the fear of force that stops Saddam from acting to gain domination in the region.
That is why, on the unanimous recommendation of my national security team -- including the vice president, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the secretary of state and the national security adviser -- I have ordered a strong, sustained series of air strikes against Iraq.
They are designed to degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors.
At the same time, we are delivering a powerful message to Saddam. If you act recklessly, you will pay a heavy price. We acted today because, in the judgment of my military advisers, a swift response would provide the most surprise and the least opportunity for Saddam to prepare.
If we had delayed for even a matter of days from Chairman Butler's report, we would have given Saddam more time to disperse his forces and protect his weapons.
Also, the Muslim holy month of Ramadan begins this weekend. For us to initiate military action during Ramadan would be profoundly offensive to the Muslim world and, therefore, would damage our relations with Arab countries and the progress we have made in the Middle East.
That is something we wanted very much to avoid without giving Iraq's a month's head start to prepare for potential action against it.
Finally, our allies, including Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, concurred that now is the time to strike. I hope Saddam will come into cooperation with the inspection system now and comply with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. But we have to be prepared that he will not, and we must deal with the very real danger he poses.
So we will pursue a long-term strategy to contain Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction and work toward the day when Iraq has a government worthy of its people.
First, we must be prepared to use force again if Saddam takes threatening actions, such as trying to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems, threatening his neighbors, challenging allied aircraft over Iraq or moving against his own Kurdish citizens.
The credible threat to use force, and when necessary, the actual use of force, is the surest way to contain Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program, curtail his aggression and prevent another Gulf War.
Second, so long as Iraq remains out of compliance, we will work with the international community to maintain and enforce economic sanctions. Sanctions have cost Saddam more than $120 billion -- resources that would have been used to rebuild his military. The sanctions system allows Iraq to sell oil for food, for medicine, for other humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people.
We have no quarrel with them. But without the sanctions, we would see the oil-for-food program become oil-for-tanks, resulting in a greater threat to Iraq's neighbors and less food for its people.
The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world.
The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government -- a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people. Bringing change in Baghdad will take time and effort. We will strengthen our engagement with the full range of Iraqi opposition forces and work with them effectively and prudently.
The decision to use force is never cost-free. Whenever American forces are placed in harm's way, we risk the loss of life. And while our strikes are focused on Iraq's military capabilities, there will be unintended Iraqi casualties.
Indeed, in the past, Saddam has intentionally placed Iraqi civilians in harm's way in a cynical bid to sway international opinion.
We must be prepared for these realities. At the same time, Saddam should have absolutely no doubt if he lashes out at his neighbors, we will respond forcefully.
Heavy as they are, the costs of action must be weighed against the price of inaction. If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbors. He will make war on his own people.
And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them.
Because we're acting today, it is less likely that we will face these dangers in the future.
Let me close by addressing one other issue. Saddam Hussein and the other enemies of peace may have thought that the serious debate currently before the House of Representatives would distract Americans or weaken our resolve to face him down.
But once more, the United States has proven that although we are never eager to use force, when we must act in America's vital interests, we will do so.
In the century we're leaving, America has often made the difference between chaos and community, fear and hope. Now, in the new century, we'll have a remarkable opportunity to shape a future more peaceful than the past, but only if we stand strong against the enemies of peace.
Tonight, the United States is doing just that. May God bless and protect the brave men and women who are carrying out this vital mission and their families. And may God bless America.
Historic Record (US vs "the government")
On September 12, 2002, President George Bush appeared at the United Nations General Assembly to present his case for actions against Iraq and Saddam Hussein. In his speech he stated that the country of Iraq has violated 16 UN Security Council resolutions over the past 10 years. These sixteen resolutions are:
1. UNSCR 678 passed on November 29, 1990
2. UNSCR 686 passed on March 2, 1991
3. UNSCR 687 passed on April 3, 1991
4. UNSCR 688 passed on April 5, 1991
5. UNSCR 707 passed on August 15, 1991
6. UNSCR 715 passed on October 11, 1991
7. UNSCR 949 passed on October 15, 1994
8. UNSCR 1051 passed on March 27, 1996
9. UNSCR 1060 passed on June 12, 1996
10. UNSCR 1115 passed on June 21, 1996
11. UNSCR 1134 passed on October 23, 1997
12. UNSCR 1137 passed on November 12, 1997
13. UNSCR 1154 passed on March 2, 1998
14. UNSCR 1158 passed on September 9, 1998
15. UNSCR 1205 passed on November 5, 1998
16. UNSCR 1284 passed on December 17, 1999
These resolutions took place over the last decade along with numerous statements made by the Security Council.
Bush also stated directly that the United Nations appeased Hussein over the years by not enforcing any of these resolutions. Bush also stated that either the United Nations can join the United States or the US will go alone.
Text of UN Security Council Resolution on Iraq: November 8, 2002
United Nations
New York, New York
November 8, 2002
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution
[Adopted as Resolution 1441 at Security Council meeting 4644, 8 November 2002]
The Security Council,
Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,
Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully,
Recognizing the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,
Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,
Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area,
Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,
Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,
Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council’s repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,
Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,
Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,
Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance,
Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions,
Noting the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq’s continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions,
Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States,
Commending the Secretary-General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary-General for their efforts in this regard,
Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);
2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;
3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material;
4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;
5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC’s or the IAEA’s choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;
6. Endorses the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq;
7. Decides further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq, to facilitate their work in Iraq:
– UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available;
– All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, corresponding to those of experts on mission, provided in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA;
– UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998);
– UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities;
– Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient United Nations security guards;
– UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected;
– UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles;
– UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and
– UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage;
8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;
9. Requests the Secretary-General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;
10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA;
11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;
12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;
13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
October 9th, 1999 Letter to President Clinton Signed by Senators Levin, Lieberman, Lautenberg, Dodd, Kerrey, Feinstein, Mikulski, Daschle, Breaux, Johnson, Inouye, Landrieu, Ford and Kerry -- all Democrats
"We urge you, after consulting with Congress and consistent with the US Constitution and laws, to take necessary actions, including, if appropriate, air and missile strikes on suspect Iraqi sites to respond effectively to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs."
Chuck Schumer DEMOCRAT > October 10, 2002
"It is Hussein's vigorous pursuit of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and his present and future potential support for terrorist acts and organizations that make him a danger to the people of the united states."
There are hundreds of these quotes, your comments ignore...
Nancy Pelosi > December 16, 1998
"Saddam Hussein has been engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction technology, which is a threat to countries in the region, and he has made a mockery of the weapons inspection process."
here is a personal favorite , history will record these comments. Bush will be vindicated.
Sandy Berger (National Security Advisor to Clinton) > February 18, 1998
"He'll use those weapons of mass destruction again as he has 10 times since 1983."
I carefully considered every point you made, and studied every quote you provided. And I still don't see how any of this can justify an invasion of a foreign country and a 5+ year occupation that has cost hundreds of thousands of lives. Nope, there was something else behind it. OIL.
North Korea, Burma, Zimbabwe, Sudan... all these countries have evil dictators. Why don't we invade these countries? Because they are not in the Mideast where their shenanigans could destabilize the worlds oil supply.
You can't deny that there was an underlying OIL motive behind the Iraq invasion & occupation. Doing so would require to put your head deep in the sand.
ok. let's say we buy your argument - we invaded to secure our oil supply in the middle east. Some questions:
#1. how much oil were we importing from iRaq pre-2003 invasion? Was it our largest?
#2. How has our invasion helped our oil supply?
#3. At what point do we invade Canada, our leading supplier of oil - say $10 a gallon?
Your premise suggests we live in a country that attacks when oil prices are at $50 a barrel (2003). I surely will never agree that I live in a country that invades countries for natural resources because if that were the case, Bush would be preparing to invade canada, now that we are at $140 /barrel. It would probably take us total of 2 days and cost about 3 lives. Your argument is weak at best, disparate at worse.
from aunt rusty, she asked me to post her comments (unfiltered): Michael Where do you get all this ---I love it! "ALL in the name of
junkscience celebrated as gospel by paranoid hippies" And UT is stuck
with his broken record Bush/Cheney Bush/Cheney I do agree with Ron
It's US spoiled & I hope we didn't make the next generation worse it's time for 2steps forward so we can go 1 step forward! I think
that's out of the Communist Manefesto I
think we ALL agree that ALTERNATIVE is where it's at!! I read that
New York city was in a near panic because the horse manure was up to their ankles & oh my what are we going to do? And then along came the
car Same thing: the world was running out of whale oil for
the lamps & along came the light bulb!!!! Pray guys I can giggle
cause I'm on my way out you guys have got a ways to go _____well not
my 2 brothers Love you all See you in a minute! Me
War for Oil arguments will become weaker and weaker over time, in my estimation. If you go back and read the New York Times between 1945-1950, the USA was doomed to fail. History proved the naysayers all wrong. Same here.
Look at todays (6/22/08) announcement from the Iraqi Government. If the USA went to war for Oil, you sure have a case to prove over time. I believe it will become harder and harder, jeffro on the wrong side of history. Thankfully. I want us to PREVAIL!
Iraq to award oil contracts to foreign firms
Jun 22 09:17 AM US/Eastern
Iraq will award contracts to 41 foreign oil firms in a bid to boost production that could give multinationals a potentially lucrative foothold in huge but underdeveloped oil fields, an official said on Sunday.
"We chose 35 companies of international standard, according to their finances, environment and experience, and we granted them permission to extract oil," oil ministry spokesman Asim Jihad told AFP.
Six other state-owned oil firms from Algeria, Angola, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam will also be awarded extraction deals, Jihad said.
The agreements, to be signed on June 30, are expected to be short-term arrangements although the ministry has yet to provide a timeframe.
The deal paves the way for global energy giants to return to Iraq 36 years after late dictator Saddam Hussein chased them out, and is seen as a first step to access the earth's third largest proven crude reserves.
"They will have the first right to develop the fields," said Jihad, adding that competitive bidding would come later once the nation's long-delayed hydrocarbon law is passed by parliament.
Iraq wants to ramp up production by 500,000 barrels per day from the current average production of 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd), a level about equal to before the US-led invasion in March 2003.
Monthly exports of 2.11 million bpd currently form the bulk of the war-torn nation's revenues, and the oil ministry is keen to raise capacity over the next five years to 4.5 million barrels per day.
Iraq's crude reserves are estimated at about 115 billion barrels, but it is sorely lacking in infrastructure and the latest technology to which it was denied access under years of international sanctions after the 1991 Gulf War.
Before major investment is injected, the Baghdad parliament would also first have to finalise a controversial oil law considered by Washington as a key step towards national reconciliation.
The proposed law stipulates a fair distribution of oil revenues between Iraq's 18 provinces, a sensitive matter in a country wracked by inter-ethnic violence.
Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani said in February that he hoped an oil law would be finalised this year, but officials have said little progress has been made.
One major concern is whether the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq will share revenues.
The Kurdish regional government has signed 15 exploration and export contracts with 20 international companies since passing its own oil law last August, infuriating the Baghdad government.
Stipulating how foreign investment will be governed is also critical amid concerns that Iraqi oil revenues will be squeezed by large oil firms granted special treatment with the help of the US government.
Multinationals involved in the current deals will be focused on fields in the north and the south where wells already exist, thus requiring minimal additional investment, and skirting around the national oil law.
These agreements will be announced alongside technical support agreements (TSAs) with five foreign oil majors.
They cover Kirkuk field (Shell), Rumaila (BP), Al-Zubair (ExxonMobil), West Qurna Phase I (Chevron and Total), Maysan province development (Shell and BHP Billiton) and the Subba and Luhais fields (Anadarko, Vitol and the UAE's Dome), according to a previous media report.
"The execution will be carried out by Iraqi staff while companies will provide expertise and the machinery," said Jihad, who stressed that these were not investment contracts.
Today McCain announced 300 million dollar prize for the team that comes up with a transportation battery that can work. Obama proposes to tax the oil industry and spread the wealth to the small people.
McCain is the real change agent in this race, but if attacked like on 9/11, we can all be damn sure he will think, then act - using force if necessary.
I haven't been a McCain supporter in the past, but I like what I am hearing. Motivating industry, rather than punishing it.
Let's blog somemore. You need a RSS feed.
Futures Markets
Walter E. Williams
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
In searching for villains for rising food and oil prices, some commentators have turned to speculators, namely people trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and similar exchanges around the world. A sample of the claims: "Biofuels and droughts can't fully explain the recent food crisis -- hedge funds and small investors bear some responsibility for global hunger." "The global food crisis is likely to persist if speculative investment by the corporate world is not reined in soon, warned a top expert responsible for reporting to the United Nations on human rights violations." "Financial speculators reap profits from global hunger."
Instead of condemning commodity speculation, we ought to recognize the vital function it serves. Let's look at it with a simplified example that captures the essence of speculation in commodity futures markets.
Say that today's price of corn is $6 a bushel. I have a hunch that because of future supply and demand conditions, such as drought, war and increased other uses for corn, that in May 2009 corn will sell for $12 a bushel. I stand to make a lot of money if I buy corn now for $6 a bushel, hold it, and in May 2009 sell it for $12 a bushel. Sure, I've made a bundle of money for myself but is my speculative activity deserving of condemnation? The answer is no; I've served a valuable social function.
Supposing my guess is correct about future supply and demand conditions and corn will be scarcer in the future, what is the socially wise thing to do now so that more will be available in the future? The answer is to use less corn now. How do you get people to voluntarily use less corn now? If you said, "Let the price rise," go to the head of the class. That is exactly what happens as other speculators and I buy corn now. Today's price of corn will be bided up. The result is people will use less corn now and more corn will be available in May 2009 than would be the case if the current price of corn remained at $6. The valuable function of futures markets is that of allocating goods over time. It is wise to take the future into account in decisions that one makes today.
The futures market is no bed of roses. My guess could be wrong. There could be a bumper crop of corn and its May 2009 price might be $3 a bushel. I'd have to sell corn that I bought today for $6 a bushel for $3 in May 2009 and suffer a big loss.
We all are speculators to one degree or another. Last August, my home heating oil company offered its customers a deal. I purchased 900 gallons of oil for a spot price of $2.64 a gallon. I made the purchase with the expectation that oil prices would rise over the winter months. The previous year, I purchased 900 gallons and lost because heating oil fell from the spot price at which it was purchased. Another example is when you expect gasoline prices to be higher next week; you fill up you tank this week.
The futures market, which takes into account both the present and the future availability of goods, is a vital part of a smoothly functioning economy. Unfortunately, that fact provides little comfort to people frustrated over the high prices of food and fuel. As such, it provides fodder for political demagogues, charlatans and quacks who rush in with blame and prepare "solutions" for the problems they themselves have created -- the high prices for food and fuel are directly linked to the policies of the White House and Congress.
July 31, 2008
New Premises in Iraq
By Henry Kissinger
The U.S. presidential campaign has been so long and so intense that it seems to operate in a cocoon, oblivious to changes that should alter its premises. A striking example is the debate over withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.
Over the past year, many have proposed setting a deadline for withdrawal. Proponents have argued that a date certain would compel the Iraqi government to accelerate the policy of reconciliation; would speed the end of the war; and would enable the United States to concentrate its efforts on more strategically important regions, such as Afghanistan. Above all, they argued, the war was lost, and withdrawal would represent the least costly way to deal with the debacle.
These premises have been overtaken by events. Almost all objective observers agree that major progress has been made on all three fronts of the Iraq war: Al-Qaeda, the Sunni jihadist force recruited largely from outside the country, seems on the run in Iraq; the indigenous Sunni insurrection attempting to restore Sunni predominance has largely died down; and the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad has, at least temporarily, mastered the Shiite militias that were challenging its authority. After years of disappointment, we face the need to shift gears mentally to consider emerging prospects of success.
Of course, we cannot tell now whether these changes are permanent or whether, and to what extent, they reflect a decision by our adversaries, including Iran, to husband their forces for the aftermath of the Bush administration. But we do know that the outcome of the conflict will determine the kind of world in which the new administration will have to conduct its policies. Any appearance that radical Islamic forces were responsible for a U.S. defeat would have enormous destabilizing consequences far beyond the region. How and when to leave Iraq will therefore emerge as a principal decision for the new president.
Whatever the interpretation of recent events, the Sunni part of Iraq has created local forces backed by several Sunni states to fight al-Qaeda and indigenous insurgents. These, in turn, have contributed to easing Sunni concerns over being marginalized by the Shiite majority. All along, the Kurdish region has developed its own self-defense forces.
In this manner, prospects for reconciliation among the three parts of the country, Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni, have appeared not through legislation, as congressional resolutions applying the American experience imagined, but by necessity and a measure of military and political equilibrium. Since the need for American forces in dealing with a massive insurrection has diminished, they can increasingly concentrate on helping the Iraqi government resist pressures from neighbors and the occasional flare-up of terrorist attacks from al-Qaeda or Iranian-backed militias. In that environment, the various national and provincial elections foreseen for the next months in Iraq's constitution can help shape new Iraqi institutions.
A strategic reserve can now be created by the United States out of some of the forces currently in Iraq, with some moving to other threatened areas and others returning to the United States. American deployment is transformed from abdication into part of a geopolitical design. Its culmination should be a diplomatic conference charged with establishing a formal peace settlement. Such a conference was first assembled two years ago on the foreign ministers' level. It was composed of all of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria; Egypt; and the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. That conference should be reassembled and charged with defining an international status for Iraq and the guarantees to enforce it.
In addition, regional efforts to stabilize the situation are underway. Turkey is seeking to mediate between Israel and Syria; a Qatari initiative has achieved at least a temporary pause in the fighting in Lebanon.
Establishing a deadline is the surest way to undermine the hopeful prospects. It will encourage largely defeated internal groups to go underground until a world more congenial to their survival arises with the departure of American forces. Al-Qaeda will have a deadline against which to plan a full-scale resumption of operations. And it will give Iran an incentive to strengthen its supporters in the Shiite community for the period after the American withdrawal. Establishing a fixed deadline would also dissipate assets needed for the diplomatic endgame.
The inherent contradictions of the proposed withdrawal schedule compound the difficulties. Under the fixed withdrawal scheme, combat troops are to be withdrawn, but sufficient forces would remain to protect the U.S. Embassy, fight a resumption of al-Qaeda and contribute to defense against outside intervention. But such tasks require combat, not support, forces, and the foreseeable controversy about the elusive distinction will distract from the overall diplomatic goal. Nor is withdrawal from Iraq necessary to free forces for operations in Afghanistan. There is no need to risk the effort in Iraq to send two or three additional brigades to Afghanistan; those troops will become available even in the absence of a deadline. (It should be noted that I am a friend of Sen. John McCain and occasionally advise him.)
In a positive gesture, leading advocates of a fixed deadline, including Sen. Barack Obama, have recently put forward the idea that both withdrawal and the residual force will be condition-based. But if that is the case, why establish a deadline at all? It would suggest shifting the debate to the conditions for withdrawal rather than its timing.
These considerations explain Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's conduct on the occasion of Obama's visit to Iraq. Maliki is negotiating with the Bush administration about a status-of-forces agreement for the residual forces to remain in Iraq. Given popular attitudes and the imminence of provincial elections, he probably wanted to convey that the American presence was not planned as a permanent occupation. The accident of the arrival of a presidential candidate, who had already-published views on that subject, reinforced that incentive. To reject the senator's withdrawal plan in front of a large media contingent would have been to antagonize someone with whom Maliki might have to deal as president.
The American presence in Iraq should not be presented as open-ended; this would not be supported by either Iraqi or American domestic opinion. But neither should it be put forward in terms of rigid deadlines. Striking this balance is a way for our country to come together as a constructive outcome emerges. Thirty years ago, Congress cut off aid to Vietnam and Cambodia two years after American troops had been withdrawn and local forces were still desperate to resist. Domestic divisions had overcome all other considerations. We must not repeat the tragedy that followed.
The next president has a great opportunity to stabilize Iraq and lay the basis for a decisive turn in the war against jihadist radicalism and for a more peaceful Middle East. Surely he will want to assess the situation on the ground before setting a strategy for his term. He should not be limited by rigid prescriptions to vindicate maxims of the past, no matter how plausible they once seemed. Withdrawal is a means; the end is a more peaceful and hopeful world.
Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of State from 1973 to 1977.
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